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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper gives an overview of the garment industry in Vietnam, describes 
the apparel company Tuan Phong, based in Ho Chi Minh City. Then, I use Integrated 
Strategy Model framework of Svein Ulset to shed light on the strategic direction of the 
company in future. In particular, the growth of the company should be accomplished 
in three phases. In the next three years, capacity should be expanded along with 
reorganization of the current organization. In the following three years, exports should 
begin. Here, we recommend a priority of foreign markets in this order: the US, the 
EU, and Japan, although flexibility is considered better than dependency on one 
single market. Also, diversification into hot items is expected. In the following three 
years, capabilities upgrading to move from original equipment manufacturer to 
original brand manufacturer is critical to bypass the regional middlemen in East Asia.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
With its full membership in the WTO in 2007, Vietnam has opened itself to 
the world. In the near future, structural changes and opportunities should arise in 
many aspects of the economy with entry of foreign enterprises, liberalization of the 
private sector, etc. Indeed, “The state enterprises now operate under a market 
environment rather than under the compulsory orders of the central planning 
committee. In addition, Vietnam has opened up opportunities for the development of 
the private sector in which the market mechanism has gradually emerged (CIE 1998). 
As a result, Vietnam has achieved an impressive economic growth, which averages 
around 7.8 per cent per year for the 1991-2000 period”1 
Regarding the apparel market, Vietnam is expected to grow as a 
manufacturing base to supply to foreign buyers i n developed countries. More and 
more orders from corporate buyers are supposed to take place. As a matter of fact, 
“Vietnam‟s Textile and Garment industry plays an important role in the Vietnamese 
economy. The industry consists of around 2,000 enterprises; of which 25 are state-
owned and 1.500 are private enterprises including 450 foreign-owned enterprises, 
with over 2 million employees involved. 55 % of them are located in and around Ho 
Chi Minh City, 30 % in and around Hanoi, and 15 % in and around Da Nang. Vietnam 
is ranked as the 10th largest textile and apparel export country in the world.”2 
Therefore, to catch up with the speed of this growing pie of export orders and 
to capture a leadership position in the future is important for many Vietnamese 
manufacturers. For example, “Reported by Vitas, a line-up of big importers and well 
                                                                 
1
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_hb020/is_3_22/ai_n29236342/ (6. June 2010) 
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http://www.ambhanoi.um.dk/en/menu/CommercialServices/MarketOpportunities/Sector+Analysis/TextileAnd
Garment/ (6 . June 2010) 
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known brands such as Gap and Union Bay are negotiating export processing prices 
for 2010 with many Vietnamese firms”3 
Tuan Phong is a small company in Vietnam, with the ambition of growth to 
capture the opportunities ahead. Currently, there are constraints respecting size, 
varieties of product lines, capabilities in various areas to meet international standards 
of foreign buyers, organizational structure, and market knowledge. 
Regarding growth, there are many options at the moment. One can decide to 
focus on branding and compete in the domestic retailing market, targeting end-
customers. On the other hand, one can choose to pay attention to corporate buyers 
in foreign markets (usually developed countries), who outsource production to low-
cost countries like Vietnam and China. In this paper, I will argue that given the latter 
choice is better one for Tuan Phong, and the way in which such growth is pursued 
will be elaborated at length in the discussion. 
Therefore, the objectives of this paper are: 
_Give an overview of the Vietnamese apparel industry 
_Describe Tuan Phong and its current competitive position 
_Prescribe the direction for growth, using the Integrated Strategy Model 
_Elaborate on implementation of such strategy 
This paper is organized as follows: Chapter 1 gives a clear picture of the 
development of the apparel industry in Vietnam up until now. Given the particularity 
of the country, relevant nuances about the rapid changing situation up until the 
current moment are very important in understanding the strategy Tuan Phong can 
follow. Chapter 2 is about Tuan Phong. Here there will be information about the 
company‟s product line, size, market segment, price, competitive position, etc. 
Chapter 3 discusses the theoretical framework to be used as guidance in the strategy 
discussion. Specifically, the Integrated Strategy Model of Svein Ulset is used. Given 
the comprehensiveness of this model, I will not go into detail about every element of 
                                                                 
3
 http://www.sourcinginvietnam.com/blog/vietnams-apparel-export-to-the-us-and-eu-drop.htm (6 . June 2010) 
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it. Instead, certain elements of the model considered relevant for the case will be paid 
more attention. Chapter 4 is the discussion of the road ahead : export wi ll be the path 
to go; the rationale behind as well as the fashion in which such strategy is pursued is 
discussed using the theoretical framework aforementioned. Chapter 5 is the 
conclusion. 
Due to budget constraint, subscribed information and many of the most 
recent researches that could contribute to the paper were not obtained. Time and 
geographical distance also limit information exchange between me and key 
informers.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INDUSTRY INFORMATION 
 
1.1. The world trade regime: 
A quick look at the history development of the global apparel business will 
reveal that this is a heavily regulated industry. 
To begin with, the period from 1956 to 1973 was characterized by 
protectionism. For example, the voluntary export restraint VER was used by the US 
against Japanese imports. Thus, “production facilities soon sprang up in other lower 
wage countries, and imports from other Asian countries to the US overtook that of 
Japan”. In addition, a number of short-term bilateral agreements flourished: “a three-
year bilateral agreement with Japan covering wool and synthetic textiles. Similar five-
year bilateral agreements were also signed with Hong Kong, Taiwan and Korea.”4 
On the other side of the Atlantic Ocean, Europe also built a bulwark against 
imports. “European countries also sought protection from Asian imports. Japan, once 
an advocate of free textile and the world largest exporter of textiles, wanted trade 
restrictions, as it was losing ground to less developed countries and had become a 
major textiles importer.”5 
In the period from 1974 until 1994, there was a partial reduction in trade 
barriers. The MFA-Multifibre Arrangement, signed in 1974, is described as follows: 
“generally, importing countries were required to allow for an annual quota growth rate 
of 6%. During the 21 years of the MFA from 1974 to 1994, the quota system gained 
depth, involving more countries, and the product coverage also became wider”. 
What‟s more, renegotiation, often annually, almost always aggravate the 
                                                                 
4
 Lee, A. et al (2005). Trade restrictions and Hong Kong’s textiles and clothing industry. Asia Case Research 
Centre, University o Hong Kong. <http://cb.hbsp.harvard.edu/cb/web/product_detail.seam?R=HKU383-PDF-
ENG&conversationId=152761&E=67499> (6. June 2010) 
5
 Lee, A. et al (2005). Trade restrictions and Hong Kong’s texti les and clothing industry. Asia Case Research 
Centre, University o Hong Kong. <http://cb.hbsp.harvard.edu/cb/web/product_detail.seam?R=HKU383-PDF-
ENG&conversationId=152761&E=67499> (6. June 2010) 
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protectionistic nature of these bilateral agreements. For instance, “the 6% annual 
quota growth rate was often reduced”, “unilateral actions by importing countries were 
allowed under the MFA whenever imports of a particular product caused or 
threatened market disruption”.6 
However, the latest period from 1994 to 2004 is brighter for trade. 
First of all, the MFA was revised because it violated GATT‟s general 
preference for customs tariffs7. In addition, “it was also in conflict with the GATT 
principle of treating all trading partners equally as agreements under the MFA were 
bilateral rather than multi lateral”8. On the whole, the MFA was good news for 
Vietnam; because in order “to circumvent the quota restrictions, buyers and 
manufacturers turned to countries that were relatively new to textiles and clothing 
trade and therefore were not subject to quota restrictions”9. In particular, “garment 
manufacturing only sprang up from mid-1980s to late 1990s in some Southeast Asian 
countries, which were previously little known in the global industry”10. 
Therefore, a mechanism was in place to gradually abolish all protectionistic 
measures. That is: The ATC-The Agreement on Textiles and Clothing. This is “a 10- 
year programme for the progressive integration of textiles and clothing into GATT 
1994 rules”. However, there is something called the transitional safeguard 
mechanism, “a special transitional safeguard mechanism to protect WTO members 
against insurgence in imports that could damage or threaten their domestic industries 
                                                                 
6
 Lee, A. et al (2005). Trade restrictions and Hong Kong’s textiles and clothing industry. Asia Case Research 
Centre, University o Hong Kong. <http://cb.hbsp.harvard.edu/cb/web/product_detail.seam?R=HKU383-PDF-
ENG&conversationId=152761&E=67499> (6. June 2010) 
7
 International Textiles and Clothing Bureau. 2001. Conduct of textile trade r elations under GATT/WTO. 
<http://www.itcb.org/Documents/itcb-mi1.pdf> (6. June 2010) 
8
 Lee, A. et al (2005). Trade restrictions and Hong Kong’s textiles and clothing industry. Asia Case Research 
Centre, University o Hong Kong. <http://cb.hbsp.harvard.edu/cb/web/product_detail.seam?R=HKU383-PDF-
ENG&conversationId=152761&E=67499> (6. June 2010) 
9 Hyvärinen, A. 2000. Introduction of the agreement on textiles and clothing (ATC) and its implications on 
developing country producers/exporters. ITC, Geneva. 
<http://www.intracen.org/btp/issues/atc/publications/ecolabatc.pdf> (6. June 2010) 
10
 Lee, A. et al (2005). Trade restrictions and Hong Kong’s textiles and clothing industry. Asia Case Research 
Centre, University o Hong Kong. <http://cb.hbsp.harvard.edu/cb/web/product_detail.seam?R=HKU383-PDF-
ENG&conversationId=152761&E=67499> (6. June 2010) 
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during the transitional period”. January 1st 2005 is the date for complete quota phase-
out.11 
The implication here is that “countries that were severely constrained by 
quotas, notably China and India, would benefit most. On the contrary, developing 
countries that benefited from and were protected by the restrictions would find it 
difficult to deal with the open competition”. Thus, this can be seen as bad news for 
Vietnam, since “the growth of export revenues for China and India, however, could 
occur at the expense of other less competitive countries”. For example, Bangladesh 
and Sri Lanka were both forecasted to be losers: “it was estimated that more than 
one million jobs would be lost in Bangladesh in the years following the complete 
quota phase-out”; and “for Sri Lanka, it was forecasted that about 40 to 50% of 
factories would close down and about 100 000 jobs would be lost”12. 
It‟s actually not that bad for developing countries. At least, “the post-quota 
era was not expected to be all rosy for China”13. In fact, “since China could be 
categorized by the US as a non-market economy unti l December 2016, it is 
particularly prone to anti-dumping measures under the so-called “non-market 
economy methodology””14. 
Following the ATC, despite opposition from the US and the EU, “the WTO 
was not receptive to the idea of extending the quota regime, and no country had 
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 Lee, A. et al (2005). Trade restrictions and Hong Kong’s textiles and clothing industry. Asia Case Research 
Centre, University o Hong Kong. <http://cb.hbsp.harvard.edu/cb/web/product_detail.seam?R=HKU383-PDF-
ENG&conversationId=152761&E=67499> (6. June 2010) 
12
 Oxfam. 2004. Stiched up: how rich-country protectionism in textiles and clothing trade prevents poverty 
alleviation. <http://www.oxfam.org.uk/resources/policy/trade/downloads/bp60_textiles.pdf> (6. June 2010) 
13
 Lee, A. et al (2005). Trade restrictions and Hong Kong’s textiles and clothing industry. Asia Case Research 
Centre, University o Hong Kong. <http://cb.hbsp.harvard.edu/cb/web/product_detail.seam?R=HKU383-PDF-
ENG&conversationId=152761&E=67499> (6. June 2010) 
14
 Bei, H. (2004) ”Tide of complaint foreseen…” 
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agreed to raise it at the WTO”15. On the other hand, “both the US and the EU had not 
been shy in invoking transitional safeguards or anti-dumping measures”16. 
 
1.2. History of the Textiles and Garment (T&G) industry in Vietnam:  
“The textile and garment industry been existing in Vietnam for at least a 
century, while traditional handicraft activities such as embroidery, silk weaving have 
existed for much longer. Vietnamese historians have written that many Vietnamese 
dynasties had to tribute different kind of valuable fabrics made by Vietnamese to  
China”; “it is said that the development history of the industry has started when Nam 
Dinh Textile Complex was established in 1897. The industry grew more quickly in the 
post Second World War. In the south, the firms were established by using modern 
European machinery. In the North, state enterprises equipping machinery from 
China, Former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, were also established over this 
period”17 
There are two important chronological milestones: first, after the liberation of 
the North in 1954, the government restored and reconstructed the Nam Dinh silk 
factory, established some new ones like Vinh Phu Factory, Thang Long Garment 
Company, etc. Second, after the reunification of Vietnam in 1975, the government 
took over many companies in the south, e.g. Thang Loi Textile Company, Viet Thang 
Textile Company, etc. The government then established new companies like Hanoi 
Textile, Nha Trang Texti le. Lastly, local authorities also took part in setting up T&G 
companies18. 
                                                                 
15
 International Herald Tribune. 2004. Bush rejects pressure from Congress to extend global textile quotas. Paris 
June 11
th
, 2004 
16
 Lee, A. et al (2005). Trade restrictions and Hong Kong’s textiles and clothing industry. Asia Case Research 
Centre, University o Hong Kong. <http://cb.hbsp.harvard.edu/cb/web/product_detail.seam?R=HKU383-PDF-
ENG&conversationId=152761&E=67499> (6. June 2010) 
17
 Vietnam clothing and textile industry handbook. (2010): International Business Publications, USA 
18
 Vietnam clothing and textile industry handbook. (2010): International Business Publications, USA 
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Following 1975, “Vietnam adopted a command-style economy, which 
permitted very limited private sector activity, even in agriculture. The strategy also 
locked the country out of high-growth East Asian economies, and further enmeshed it 
with the then Comecon bloc, in particular the USSR”19.  This market has remained 
the major destinations for Vietnamese apparel unti l the collapse of the USSR in the 
late 1980s. Right then, Vietnamese manufacturers quickly switched to supply to the 
quota-free Asian markets20.  
A very important regulatory change was the Reform program in 1986 called 
Doi Moi. This is the result of the disappointment from the strategy of locking into the 
Comecon; and the reform essentially involves “a shift from a centrally planned to a 
market economy, and opening the economy to international trade and investment”21. 
Moreover, “the collapse of the USSR in the early 1990s, and the sudden withdrawal 
of the large Soviet aid program, strengthened the position of the reformers and 
accelerated this process”22. 
 It is worth noting that “even with the Doi Moi, the goal was to initiate a 
transition from a planned to a market economy, rather than to reform the political 
system, whereas the country continues to be organized politically along orthodox 
communist lines”23 
International relations have been improving for Vietnam over the years. With 
the EU-Vietnam Texti le and Clothing Agreement in 1992, “by late 1990s 43.3% of 
                                                                 
19
 Hil l , H. Export Success Against the Odds : A Vietnamese Case Study. 2000. World Development, Vol. 28, No. 2. 
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=253247> (6. June 2010) 
20
 Thomsen, L. Accessing Global Value Chains? 2007. The Role of Business State Relations in the Private Clothing 
Industry in Vietnam. Journal of Economic Geography, Vol. 7, Issue 6, p. 753 -776. 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1155886> (6. June 2010) 
21
 Hil l , H. Export Success Against the Odds: A Vietnamese Case Study. 2000. World Development, Vol. 28, No. 2. 
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=253247> (6. June 2010) 
22
 Hil l , H. Export Success Against the Odds: A Vietnamese Case Study. 2000. World Development, Vol. 28, No. 2. 
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=253247> (6. June 2010) 
23
 Thomsen, L. Accessing Global Value Chains? 2007. The Role of Business State Relations in the Private Clothing 
Industry in Vietnam. Journal of Economic Geography, Vol. 7, Issue 6, p. 753 -776. 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1155886> (6. June 2010) 
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Vietnam‟s clothing exports were going to the EU market”24. Thus, Vietnam‟s 
experienced an export success in T&G: “Exports have risen from $43 million to over 
$1.3 billion from 1985 to 1996”25. “Quota-free Asian markets were among the first 
that Vietnam‟s producers targeted”, and the EU was a major market for garment 
exports thanks to quotas from bilateral agreements in 1992, 2003, and a revision in 
2005 which allowed Vietnam to export to the EU without quotas. Vietnam became a 
WTO member in 200726. In addition, ”by 1996, Europe and Japan absorbed a similar 
proportion of Vietnam‟s garment exports (43% and 42%, respectively of the tota l), 
with developing East Asia buying most of the rest”27 
On the other hand, the relation between Vietnam and the US was getting 
better with the lift of the US embargo on Vietnam in 1993. Nevertheless, there were 
extremely high tariffs because Vietnam was denied normal trade relations (NTR), 
because the country is not considered a “non-market economy”28. Good news came 
in December 2001 when the US-Vietnam Bilateral Trade Agreement (UBSTA) took 
effect, thereby Vietnam became an NTR. After that, “Vietnamese textile and garment 
exports to the US rose from $49 million in 2001 to an astonishing $951 million in 
2002”; but “MFA-style export quotas to the US were imposed on Vietnam with effect 
from 1 May 2003”29. Anyway, “the bilateral trade agreement with the USA, effective 
                                                                 
24
 Thomsen, L. Accessing Global Value Chains? 2007. The Role of Business State Relations in the Private Clothing 
Industry in Vietnam. Journal of Economic Geography, Vol. 7, Issue 6, p. 753 -776. 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1155886> (6. June 2010) 
25
 Hil l , H. Export Success Against the Odds: A Vietnamese Case Study. 2000. World Development, Vol. 28, No. 2. 
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=253247> (6. June 2010) 
26
 Thomsen, L. Accessing Global Value Chains? 2007. The Role of Business State Relations in the Private Clothing 
Industry in Vietnam. Journal of Economic Geography, Vol. 7, Issue 6, p. 753 -776. 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1155886> (6. June 2010) 
27
 Hil l , H. Export Success Against the Odds: A Vietnamese Case Study. 2000. World Development, Vol. 28, No. 2. 
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=253247> (6. June 2010) 
28
 USITC (2002) US-Vietnam Bilateral Trade Agreeement takes effect, heralding lower duties for imports from 
Vietnam. International Economic Review. US International Trade Commission of Economi cs USITC, Publication 
4389 
29
 Nadvi, K. et al. 2004. Vietnam in the global garment and textile value chain: impacts on firms and workers. 
Journal of International Development, Dev. 16, p. 111-123. 
<http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/journal/106573055/abstract?CRETRY=1&SRETRY=0 > (6. June 2010) 
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from December 2001, has turned the USA almost from scratch to become the single 
largest market for textiles and garments from Vietnam. In 2002, 30% of the exports 
went to the USA, 20% to the EU, and 18% to Japan”30. 
In 2007, Vietnam became a full member of the WTO. All trade restrictions 
were abolished. The great potential of the EU and US market should have been 
unleashed. Popular belief at the time was like this: “another milestone was reached 
on 11 January 2007, when Vietnam joined the WTO and the USA was obliged to 
remove all quotas on textile and clothing imports from the country. This removal of 
quotas is widely expected to boost US demand for Vietnamese clothing, especially 
for lower-end products”31 
 However, the financial crisis 2008 hit the industry. “Vietnam Textile and 
Garment Association (Vitas) has reported that the country‟s apparel export in first ten 
months to two major markets US and Europe Union fell 4.5 percent and 3.5 percent 
correspondingly compared with the same period of 2008”32 
                                                                 
30
 Knutsen, Hege Merete and Nguyen, Cuong Manh. 2004. Preferential treatment in a trasition economy: the 
case of state-owned enterprises in the textile and garment industry in Vietnam. Norwegian Journal of 
Geography, 58:3, 125-135. <http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/content~db=all~content=a713800941> (6. 
June 2010) 
31
 <http://www.just-style.com/analysis/vietnam-eyes-soaring-textile-and-clothing-exports-by-
2010_id98051.aspx> (6. June 2010) 
32
< http://www.sourcinginvietnam.com/blog/vietnams -apparel-export-to-the-us-and-eu-drop.htm> (6. June 
2010) 
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CHAPTER 2 
COMPANY INFORMATION 
 
1.1 Brief history: 
In 1992, Tuan Phong was a small sewing factory with about thirty workers 
and fifteen machines. The factory produced khaki trousers and supplied to markets 
(physical places) in Ho Chi Minh City, e.g. An Dong and Tan Binh markets. Sellers in 
these markets in turn, sell to wholesalers who distribute the products to retailers in 
Ho Chi Minh City, i.e. to shops in the city centre or to shops and physical markets in 
other provinces. 
At that time, end-customers (I mean the typical target customers of Tuan 
Phong) mostly buy clothes at shops or markets. In addition, this period was 
characterized by keen competition among many small suppliers, who produce 
clothes of inferior quality, sell at low price but place fake brands on their products like 
Dockers, Armani, etc. Tuan Phong was no exception. 
2001 marks the beginning of an increase of supermarkets in Vietnam. Many 
supermarkets were opened, e.g. Saigon Coop, Big C, Metro, etc. The owners believe 
that from here, their target customers also switched to the habit of buying clothes in 
supermarkets, instead of physical markets and shops. In other words, the 
supermarkets were more and more replacing physical markets and small shops as 
the main distribution channel of clothing for the low-end, quality-conscious 
customers. They put it like this: as customers go to supermarkets to buy commodities 
like shampoos, toothpaste, etc. they also move to the clothing areas; and over time 
establish a habit of spending their budget on clothes in supermarket as well. 
Thus, since 2001 Tuan Phong has moved to sell at supermarkets, 
abandoning the old ways of distribution. Working with supermarkets, thing had to set 
in more formal ways. First, the company had to abandon the fake-brand strategy and 
have its own brand name; thus the brand Zennio was born. Second, sales revenues 
will be documented on red bills for value-added tax. 
16 
 
Tuan Phong officially became Tuan Phong Ltd, a company of limited liability 
in 2003. It has transformed itself from a very small factory to an SME with about one 
hundred workers and eighty machines. Below is the categorization of business legal 
entities for in Vietnam: 
Table 1-Company types33 
Private company Owned by one individual who is liable for all activities to the limit of all 
his/her assets. An individual is entitled to establish one private company 
only. 
Limited liability 
company (Ltd) with 
one member 
Owned by one organization or individual. The owner is liable for all debts 
and other property obligations up to the amount of the charter capital of 
the enterprise. The company is managed by the owner as the chairman of 
the company and a director or general director. 
Limited liability 
company(Ltd) with 
two or more 
members 
Owned by several (up to 50 members), who may be individuals or 
organizations. A member is liable for the debts and other property 
obligations of the enterprise up to the amount of capital he/she has 
contributed. The company is managed by a member’s council, a 
chairperson of the council and a director. 
Joint stock company 
(JSC) 
A JSC is either established from the outset as private or an equitized SOE. 
The charter capital is divided into shares, and shareholders (a minimum of 
three), who may be either individuals or organizations, are liable for the 
debts and other property obligations of the enterprise up to the amount 
they have contributed. A JSC must have ordinary shares and preference 
shares, and usually shareholders are free to assign their shares to other 
persons with some restrictions. The company is managed by a General 
Meeting of Shareholders, a Board of Management and a director. 
Source: Vietnam Economic Times No. 150, August 2006 
 
                                                                 
33
 Thomsen, L. Accessing Global Value Chains? 2007. The Role of Business State Relations in the Private Clothing 
Industry in Vietnam. Journal of Economic Geography, Vol. 7, Issue 6, p. 753 -776. 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1155886> (6. June 2010) 
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Orders have been increasing year by year since the company was 
established, and sales have been impressive: 
Table 2-Revenues since 2005, currency=VND34 
Year 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Revenues 9 billions 16 billions 22 billions 30 billions 36 billions 
 
Table 3-Garment sales of Vinatex since 2006, currency= VND35 
Year 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Viet Tien 6 billions 8.7 billions N/A N/A 
Gia Hoi 7.5 billions 10 billions N/A N/A 
To Kim Hai 8.3 billions 7.8 billions N/A N/A 
Thanh Cong 4.3 billions 4.9 billions N/A N/A 
Thang Loi 7.3 billions 5.6 billions N/A N/A  
Viet Thang 3.8 billions 5.7 billions N/A N/A  
Tuan Phong 4.7 billions 6.5 billions 10 billions 12 billions 
Total 239 billions 301 billions N/A  N/A 
 
Table 4-Garment sales of Metro in 2007, currency= VND36 
Year 2007 2008 2009 
                                                                 
34
 Interview 
35
 Interview 
36
 Interview 
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Aulantic (the private 
label of Metro itself) 
40 billions N/A N/A 
Ha Gatini  28 billions N/A N/A 
Tuan Phong 2.4 billions 7 billions 9 billions 
Total 140 billions N/A  N/A 
 
A quick look at the tables above shows that Tuan Phong is relatively a small 
player, and that there are many small players with no dominant ones who sell in 
Vinatex. In case of Metro, the private label Aulantic and Ha Gatini are the two most 
dominant players. 
 
1.2 Supplier-buyer relationship of Tuan Phong: 
Tuan Phong produces khaki pants and jeans under the brand name Zennio. 
Khaki pants have been the main focus, accounting for roughly 70% of monthly 
revenues. The products are distributed in domestic supermarket chains, notably 
Coop Mart, Vinatex, and Metro. While Coop Mart and Vinatex are state-owned, and 
Metro is a foreign-owned one. As of 2008, there were about 100 supermarkets 
belonging to these chains all over the country from the north to the south, and the 
number is supposed to go up in the coming years. 
Coop Mart and Vinatex have the following arrangement with Tuan Phong. 
After signing the contract to sell products at these supermarkets, Tuan Phong is 
supposed to manage sales and promotion itself so that revenues would be high. At 
the end of the month, twenty percent of revenues will go to the supermarket, and 
eighty percent belongs to Tuan Phong. In this mode, collection of sales revenue for 
Tuan Phong is at the end of the month, the company has the discretion to set prices 
and is totally responsible for the sales performance. 
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On the other hand, Metro buys the products from Tuan Phong and payment 
is made earlier. After the deal, sales management is left to the supermarket. Metro 
would buy in very large orders but requires lower price. 
 
1.3 Market segments and domestic competitive dynamics: 
According to the owners, even among supermarket brands, there are 
different levels of price ranges between companies. The lowest class is suppliers 
who sell their products from 80 000 VND to 110 000 VND, with relatively inferior 
product quality. The middle class is suppliers who set prices from 100 000 VND to 
200 000 VND. Tuan Phong belongs to this group, along with other competitors like 
Huong Thoi, Tan Hoang Anh, Tuong Duy. The „high class‟ are populated mainly by 
state-owned companies like Viet Tien, Viet Thang, Nha Be, Tay Do. They sell from 
150 000 VND to 200 000 VND. 
The figure below gives an illustration of fashion brands. 
Figure 1-Hierachy strucure37 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As aforementioned, Tuan Phong‟s customers belong to the mass market, 
competing directly with Binga, Viettien, Vietthang jeans, Torino, etc. Here there are 
many small competitors. Noone is really a market leader. It is worth noting that SOEs 
are very active at the export market, but not so at the domestic one. However, we 
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can still find many SOE players in the domestic market, especially at the mass 
market segment: Viet Tien, Gia Hoi, To Kim Hai, etc. At the aspirational level, their 
presence is more limited. The reason, according to insiders‟ opinions, is that SOEs 
are not as good as some private companies and especially foreign companies in 
branding and marketing, which plays a more and more important role than price and 
quality if we move up the above hierarchy. Another reason is that the export market 
was expanding very quickly, even SOEs often find themselves limited in terms of 
capacity to satisfy foreign orders, thus they have to subcontract orders to other 
factories38. Furthermore, “some large state owned enterprises have their own retail 
outlets in major cities including Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City, but for most the 
domestic market is of little importance and the goods that are sold at such outlets are 
often overproduced garments for exports”39. 
That said. There are a few exceptions. Recently, a limited number of SOE 
brands have ventured into the aspirational field: “Previously, Vietnamese brand 
names did not develop distribution networks or sales at big trade centres, simply 
because they thought they would not have room in spaces reserved for foreign big 
brands. Nowadays, the companies think big. High end trademarks have been trying 
to penetrate big trade centres. San Sciaro products, for example, are available at the 
Parkson chain, while Gosto, Jemma, Mattana, TT-up, Manhattan are selling at Zen 
Plaza, Diamond, Parkson and Paragon”40. This is understandable, since the export 
market was in difficulty since the Financial Crisis 2008: “When large consumption 
markets such as USA, the EU and Japan meet difficulties, the garment and textile 
industry is the first sector making efforts to turn back and occupy the domestic 
market”41 
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 A rough classification would put these Vietnamese private companies in the 
aspirational group of the domestic market: Ha Gatini, N&M, PT 2000, Nino Maxx, Viet 
Thy, Blue Exchange, etc. They are now facing foreign competition, e.g. Yishion (from 
Hong Kong), etc. Typically, these brands have their exclusive stores downtown in big 
cities, and rent spaces at department stores. Typically, these retailers do have their 
own plants and design team, but will mostly order production from other 
manufacturers42. Insiders‟ opinions are that this segment is a turf of keen 
competition. Currently there aren‟t any dominant players.  
Even within this aspirational group, there are sub-levels. A „more premium‟ 
class of competitors in this category, selling their products at higher price than Ha 
Gatini, Yishion, etc. are mostly foreign brands from East Asia: Levi‟s Strauss, 
Giordano, Bossini, Mango, Espirit, and Debenham. Here the market size is supposed 
to be smaller, and yet there are relatively many entrants. A prominent feature at this 
level is that distribution carries a more exclusive character. For example, currently 
mango has only one shop, Espirit has two shops in Vietnam43. 
Lastly, at the luxury segment, international brands dominate. No room for 
local companies, either private or state-owned whatsoever. In addition, more and 
more players are supposed to enter the country in the near future: “More and more 
international fashion brands will arrive in Vietnam in the time to come, as more 
shopping malls in central HCM City open this year…Meanwhile, IPP Group, which 
once brought many brands to Vietnam, including Chanel, Lancome, Burberry, 
Salvatore Ferragamo, Bally, Coach, Tumi and Tag Heuer, has decided to cooperate 
with Saigon Tourist to upgrade the ground floor of Rex Hotel into a shopping centre 
of international brand names to be completed in the third quarter of 2010”44. 
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CHAPTER 3 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
In order to shed light on future strategy for Tuan Phong, the Integrated 
Strategy Model of Svein Ulset (2009) is used. Overall, this is how it is graphed: 
Figure 2-An integrated TCE strategy model 145 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In brief, this is what the model implies: a company has three sources of 
competitive advantage, by which it can exploit or adapt in order to derive the best 
strategy, so that performance is high. Those sources of competitive advantage are 
either from within the company: Strategic advantage, for example special assets, and 
the artful organization of such; or from without: the location, with its institutions and 
industry conditions, which can be supportive and attractive. 
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The model was originally used to discuss the strategies of multinational 
enterprises at two levels: business and corporate. First, business-level strategy of 
MNEs like market entry, strategic alliances, global competition management are 
elaborated based on the model. Second, corporate-level strategies of MNEs like 
diversification & acquisitions, multinational structures & learning, corporate 
governance, and corporate social responsibility are also explained by the same tool. 
In our case, the application of this model is somewhat different: the company 
in question is not an MNE. The export strategy of Tuan Phong that will be discussed 
somehow corresponds to the business-level strategy of market entry; with nuanced 
difference from that of an MNE: in this case, customers are corporate buyers, the 
entry here is not necessarily directly entering national markets competing with 
incumbent firms but rather, entering a competitive sphere for orders, against other 
companies from home. 
In the framework above, note that there is an arrow connecting directly 
location advantage to performance. That implies that certain conditions relating to the 
institutions, the industry, etc. can make an industry attractive and therefore the 
profitability of an „average firm‟ is high. However, within one industry there are always 
big divergences in terms of performances among firms. That is why despite the fact 
that an industry can be considered not attractive, certain exceptional firms sti ll do 
quite well. 
Each element of the framework above can be broken down into more details 
and therefore give a more elaborated strategy model as in Figure 3. In particular, the 
location advantage of can be examined in terms of institution and industry. The 
strategic advantage can be analyzed using the resource-based view of the firm, while 
the governance advantage is actually an extension from the RBV; it talks about the 
effective organization of resources. I wi ll take a tour through each elements of the 
framework. 
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Institutions: this is the rules of the game. There are two kinds of institutions: 
formal and informal. The former refers to the laws, regulations, etc. while the latter 
talks about cultures, norms, and ethics.46 
Figure 3-An integrated TCE strategy model 247 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Regarding institutions in market entry decision, there are three formal 
institutional constraints: regulatory, trade barriers, and currency risks 48, of which 
regulatory and trade barriers are more relevant in our case. 
Regulatory risks are defined as “those risks associated with unfavourable 
government policies”49. In case of export market, the world trade regime as well as 
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the Vietnamese government can impose unfavourable conditions for Tuan Phong. 
For example, tariffs, quotas, anti-dumping measures can limit the possibilities of 
entering the export field. On the other hand, inefficient quota allocation mechanism 
from the Vietnamese government can also lead to difficulties for Tuan Phong. On the 
other hand, certain regulatory trends like liberalization of the world trade regime or 
privatization of the domestic industry can imply opportunities and market gaps to fi ll.  
Resources and capabilities have a lot of implication on how Tuan Phong can 
enter the export market. The theoretical approach for this element of the model is the 
Resource-based view of the firm, which is defined as “a leading perspective of 
strategy which suggests that differences in firm performance are most fundamentally 
driven by differences in firm resources and capabilities”50 Resources and capabilities 
can then be divided into tangible or intangible. Tangible resources and capabilities 
are “assets that are observable and more easily quantified”51 and some examples are 
financial, physical, technological, and organizational resources and capabilities. On 
the other hand, intangible resources and capabilities are “hard-to-observe and 
difficult-to-codify resources and capabilities”52. Some examples of this are human, 
innovation, and reputation resources and capabilities. 
Heavily emphasized in the resource-based view is the VRIO framework. V 
stands for valuable, R for rare, I for inimitable, and O for organization. First, there is 
the question of value: “only value -adding resources and can possibly lead to 
competitive advantage, whereas non-value-adding capabilities may lead to 
competitive disadvantage”53. Second, there is the question of rarity, the rarer your 
resources are, the better it is, just being valuable but not rare “will lead to competitive 
parity but not an advantage”54. Third, there is the question of inimitability, for which 
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intangible resources are supposed to be more difficult to imitate than tangible ones. 
Lastly, there is the question of organization. This is about how to organize the 
resources and capabilities in an effective manner. For example, decisions about 
whether to integrate an activities in-house or to outsource using value chain analysis 
is a way to effectively organize capabilities, after identifying which ones are core 
activities and which ones are peripheral55.  
Regarding entry mode, for the case of Tuan Phong, we can look at it as how 
the company will insert itself into the global value chain. The company can enter as 
an original equipment manufacturer, or an original brand manufacturer, directly 
exports to foreign market, subcontract to other exporters, or indirectly export through 
regional trading companies, etc. As will be analyzed later, there is a close link 
between a company‟s capacity, capabilities, experiences, international contacts, etc. 
and the level of service it can offer to corporate buyers, and therefore the entry mode. 
Since the growth strategy proposed for Tuan Phong takes a long time frame, we‟ll 
see that there is an evolutionary nature in how the company can gradually upgrade 
itself in the global apparel business. 
So, for the analysis of Tuan Phong‟s growth strategy, certain elements from 
the model will be given most attention: institution, resources and capabilities, 
governance, and strategy. On the contrary, I‟ll not go into any depth about the 
transaction-cost theory regarding the discriminating alignment of resources and 
governance, I‟ll not mention the industry-based view, with its emphasis on Porter‟s 
Diamond framework. In brief, the theoretical framework will be used in the most 
relevant way, combined with literature from fashion-related sources to shed light on 
the company‟s strategy. 
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CHAPTER 4 
DISCUSSION 
 
In this chapter, I‟ll argue that the conditions of institution is highly supportive 
for the entering the export market; the governance modes from which Tuan Phong 
can exploit in an evolutionary manner, and capabilities the company need to 
strategically focus in order to move on. 
 
4.1 Institutions: 
In order to insert oneself into the global apparel value chain, a company 
needs to satisfy certain requirements of the chain. This is called the global value 
chain approach, GVC. The main entry barriers to the chain are industry, market, 
chain, and institution56. Industry entry barriers are about entry barriers as in Porter‟s 
diamond. The clothing industry is considered to have relatively low entry barriers “due 
to the high labour intensity and correspondingly modest investment”57. Market entry 
barriers are about the varying degrees of difficulty to enter specific national end-
markets, due to different tariffs and quota. Chain entry barriers are related to 
resources and capabilities needed in order to successfully cooperate with other 
members of the chain. Lastly, the institutions also serve as “local and national 
regulatory influences over the construction of supplier entry barriers”58. In this 
section, we‟ll see that the institutional framework in Vietnam has profound impact on 
the opportunities for local companies. 
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4.1.1 Industry growth due to liberalized world trade regime: 
Industry growth is a rationale behind why pursuing garment export is a 
reasonable strategy. The more liberalized world trade regime means that the market 
entry barriers into the global value chain, as aforementioned in the introduction, is 
greatly reduced. 
With the dismantling of barriers in the world trade regime over time, the 
export markets for Vietnamese garments have been growing quite fast. Indeed, 
“Exports have risen from $43 million in 1988 to over $1.3 billion in 1996. They 
approximately doubled (in nominal US$ terms, in 1989, and over each of the periods 
1989-91, 1991-92, 1992-94, and 1994-96”, plus “garments have been by far the most 
important, its exports in the 1990s generally exceeding those of textiles by a factor of 
six”59. 
For a more recent picture, “all together we can conclude that at the industry 
level exports have continued to rise steeply after 2004 to the main markets, with the 
exception of Japan where growth has been more modest”60. Below is the data from 
the same source: 
Table 5-Garment exports to main markets, Vietnam, 2000-2007, in US$ 
million61 
Market 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Growth 
2004-
2007 
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US 50 45 495 1796 2474 2603 3044 4465 80.5% 
EU 609 599 609 580 762 882 1243 1489 95.4% 
Japan 620 588 620 514 531 604 628 704 32.6% 
Others 614 730 614 587 619 749 919 1122 81.3% 
Total 1892 1962 1892 3654 4386 4838 5834 7780 77.4% 
Source: Vietnam Textile and Apparel Association (VITAS) (http://www.vntextile.com) 
As the table indicates, overall growth of garment exports was 77% from 2004 
to 2007. A closer look reveals that “from almost no (direct) export to the US market in 
2001, it constituted 57% of the export from Vietnam in 2007”62. 
To make a comparison with other exporting countries, we can look at how 
Vietnamese exports have been performing in the US market alone: 
Table 6-US imports of apparel, 2004-200763 
 Value (US$, in billion) Share (%) 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Vietnam 2.562 2.725 3.222 4.358 4 4 4.5 5.9 
China 8.928 15.143 18.517 22.745 13.8 22 25.9 30.8 
Rest of 
the 
world 
53.278 50.845 49.890 46.819 82.3 74 69.7 63.3 
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Total 64.768 68.713 71.629 73.922 100 100 100 100 
Source: Major Shippers Report: Us Imports by Category, October 2008. Available at 
http://www.otexa.ita.doc.gov/msr/catV1.htm 
The table shows that “garment import to the US market has been increasing 
but with a falling growth rate from about 6% in 2005 to a modest 3% in 2007, but the 
shifts over the four-year period in the distribution of import shares have been 
significant”. Also, China managed to double its US import share from 13.8% to 
30.8%, leading to decreases of US import share for Latin American and some Asian 
countries, e.g. Mexico and Bangladesh. Despite that, Vietnam has achieved about 
50% increase in its share of US garment import. So, “Vietnam has performed much 
better than the average of the rest of the world, but far behind the increase in the 
export from China”64. 
In fact, Vietnamese export performance in the US market has been very 
impressive.  In 1999, 85% of Vietnamese export go to the EU and Japan, only 2% 
were to the US; then in 2000, after the bilateral trade agreement UBSTA cutting 
average tariff from 35% to 5%, T&G exports rose dramatically from 49$ million in 
2001 to 952$ million in 2002, resulting in quota imposition from the US in 2003  
Moreover, “its competitiveness in the Japanese market shows clearly that 
Vietnamese firms can operate in a quota-free environment and retain market share”  
65. 
Such strong growth in apparel exports, compared to the rest of the world and 
in second place to China, has sustained until recently: “It‟s been almost a year since 
the US and EU lifted all restrictions against garment imports from China at the 
beginning of 2009. According to Just-Style, China‟s share of garment exports grew 
from 41.3% in 2008 to 46% in 2009. Vietnam also saw a growing market share over 
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the last year thanks to the similar reason. But for garment makers in the rest of the 
world, the double whammy from competition and recession has led to sheerer fall of 
garment sales”66. 
What‟s more, garment has even replaced the crude oil as the main export 
industry for the country67 and this growth is expected to prolong into the future. In 
2007, right after Vietnam joined the WTO, the Bush administration imposed anti-
dumping measures on Vietnamese garment exports. However, “After the eradication 
of the program, several garment companies of the US have been feeling confident 
and secure in trading with Vietnam, which is now regarded as the second largest 
supplier after China” and “Since early 2009, the US has stopped checking 
Vietnamese apparel entering the country; as a result, the apparel-manufacturing 
sector of Vietnam has been growing at a faster pace”68. 
The implication for Tuan Phong here is that exporting is a lucrative business. 
 
4.1.2. Harassment relaxed: 
The private sectors have been historically harassed by the government, with 
its inefficient SOEs dominating the market for long time. However, recently the 
situation is becoming less and less of such a grave character. 
Succinctly, these statement best describe the role of the Vietnamese 
government: “There is a large and generally inefficient state-owned enterprise sector; 
its private sector faces active harassment and discrimination” and there is 
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an“irresistible political pressure to confer additional benefits on these firms at the 
expense of private firms”69. 
The ownership structure of the industry has been featured by an extremely 
high state share; “the SOEs have occupied a predominant position in the production 
and export of textile and garment”; “although attempts are made to cut subsidies to 
SOEs and promote participation of non-SOEs, state sector still enjoy privileged 
access to land, capital, bail-out facilities and garment export quotas”; “as a result, a 
majority of production and export of textile and garment is recorded by SOEs”. In 
particular, state share in the garment sector was 36%, non-state share was 49%, and 
foreign-invested share was 15% in 1999.70 
Table 7-Garment and and textile output in Vietnam by ownership 
(percent)71 
 Garments Textiles 
 1995 2001 1995 2001 
State sector 34.8 31.7 56.8 48.5 
Central state 
sector 
13.2 15.6 43.6 38.1 
Local state 
sector 
21.6 16.1 13.2 10.4 
Non-state 
domestic 
47.1 43.2 25.9 23.3 
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sector 
Collective 
sector 
0.3 0.6 1.8 1.6 
Private sector 1.6 1.2 1.5 1.2 
Household 
sector 
35.7 21.9 21.6 12.8 
Mixed 
economic 
sector 
9.4 14 1 4.7 
Foreign-
invested 
sector 
18.2 25.1 17.3 28.2 
Total 100 100 100 100 
Source: GSO (2001), from outputs at constant 1994 prices 
 
As the table shows, there is high concentration of state share in business 
activities, especially in the textile industry. This is a serious problem; indeed, “the 
pattern is clearly unusual by international norms: there is an extremely high state 
share, notwithstanding a decade of reform”; “the performance of state-owned 
enterprises, both in general and in textiles and garments, is very weak”; and “Vietnam 
is one of the most unusual cases of reforming transitional economies, i n the sense 
that the SOE share appears to have been increasing”72 
Even at the level of industry associations, the private sector is bullied. 
Idealistically, “such associations can overcome problems of „market failure‟, which 
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arise when certain measures are desirable on an industry-level basis but are 
unattractive or unprofitable for private firms… In addition, industry associations can 
play a critical role in educating policy-makers about the realities of fast-changing 
international commercial issues and challenges, the more so in a transitional 
economy such as Vietnam where comparatively few bureaucrats have an adequate 
understanding of these issues”; however, in Vietnam, “there continues to be deep 
mutual mistrust between much of the bureaucracy and the private sector… there are 
two industry associations representing firms, one principally for state enterprises, and 
the other for private firms. There is little contact between them, and the industry 
cannot speak to the government with one voice”73. 
Harassment came in many forms: access to land, access to capital, access 
to export quotas, and contact with buyers. 
Regarding land policy, there are two types: long-term rights and rental 
leases. Since 1995, all land-use rights on commercial properties were to be 
transferred into rental leases. “Land -use rights of private Vietnamese and foreign 
enterprises cannot be used for other than the licensed purposes. This rigidity reduces 
the flexibility of the enterprises because they cannot follow market signals and shift to  
other business activities… In contrast to private Vietnamese and foreign enterprises, 
land was initially assigned to state enterprises free of charge. This changed in 1995 
when the system of rental leases was introduced. Nevertheless, private Vietnamese 
enterprises and foreign enterprises pay more for the use of land than state 
enterprises”74. 
Access to capital is another form of harassment. “Loans at low interest rates 
from the mainly state-owned banks are extremely difficult for private enterprises to 
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obtain”75. It is especially unfair if we acknowledge the fact that “at the same time, the 
credit structure for state enterprises is riskier than for private Vietnamese enterprises, 
measured by the debt-equity ratio… However, private enterprises have become more 
socially accepted and some of them have grown and attained a good footing in the 
market”76. The previous problem of access to land aggravates the problem of access 
to capital as well: “it is well known that small-medium enterprises rely on land as 
collateral in loan applications”77; and “since private enterprise owners generally lack 
ownership rights over land and bui ldings, they have few possibilities to offer collateral 
against loans from the official banking system”78. 
Next, access to export quota was the most obvious obstacle for the private 
sector. Quota allocation was always to benefit SOEs. Until the mid-1990s, these firms 
were still exclusive quota receivers. “Gradually, and following much concerted 
lobbying and tedious bureaucracy, a trickle of priva te firms-usually those whose 
owners had good bureaucratic connections-began to receive small allocations”, 
which means that quotas are mainly “channeled in the direction of the industry‟s least 
efficient (state-owned) firms”79. This point illustrates how important the state-
connectedness is. Although a small amount of quotas were allocated based on 
auction, this process is not transparent, and quotas were usually traded on the black 
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market80. In addition, “resale or transfer of export quotas from state enterprises to 
private enterprises is illegal. It is, however, well known that state enterprises sell 
export quotas to private Vietnamese enterprises. It is by such indirect export quotas 
that private enterprises usually get access to the market in the European Union”81. 
Lastly, contact with buyers has been until now blocked with the best effort 
from the government.  It was of a graver character in the past: in the 1980s, 
Vietnamese citizens were even not permitted to have any communication with 
foreigners without the approval of the authority, and the situation only got more 
relaxed since the mid 1980s82. When it comes to business contacts, “state institutions 
commonly mediated contacts between buyers and Vietnamese suppliers. Suppliers 
that obtain orders through the state system are more likely to e state-owned or at 
least state-connected than private ones”, not enough, “red tape and bureaucracy 
were mentioned by buyers as being difficult to overcome, especially in cases in which 
they had tried to find other suppliers than those suggested by officials”83. For 
example, “most new buyers access new manufacturers through traditional channels 
like the Ministry of Industry, the Chamber of Commerce, or Vietnamese embassies in 
their respective countries. This particularly hinders private garment companies since 
they are basically excluded from these channels. State-controlled institutions and 
organizations usually channel buyers to traditional state -owned manufacturers, thus 
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eliminating private garment companies completely”84. In Ho Chi Minh City for 
example, contacts between local businessmen and Japanese partners were often 
channeled through AGTEK, the garment association in Ho Chi Minh City. The way it 
works is like this: orders were funneled from the association board and only those 
closest to board members can ever obtain the orders85. 
So much was about state harassment of the private sector. That‟s why so far 
SOEs have been dominating the export market: “it is clear that large SOEs have 
been able to insert themselves into the value chains of leading global buyers… while 
the numbers of private garment firms are expanding, especially in the south, such 
producers are unable to access the higher quality and higher value chains” 86. 
However, not surprisingly, SOEs‟ performance has been problematic. Moreover, “the 
managerial and incentive structures in Vietnamese SOE firms are such that there is 
generally little motivation to achieve these spillovers (learning from foreign partners) 
and to diffuse them throughout the domestic economy”87. In addition, in 2001, 
“Vietnam has never used up some categories of the granted quotas” for the EU 
market “due to the lack of appropriate technology, labour, and business skills”, and “a 
bad new for T&G is that these two industries had the lowest level of utilization rates 
among the manufacturing industries both in 1997 and first half of 1998” 88. Finally, 
most notorious was for the state sector was “the long -running financial scandal in the 
country‟s largest state-owned factory at the huge Nam Dinh complex”, in which 
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“mismanagement, poor investment decisions, and corruption occurred on a grand 
scale”89. 
The good news is that Vietnam joined the WTO in 2007, so the government 
has lost its card in controlling quotas. The EU and US, now quota -free, are very 
attractive destinations for Tuan Phong. 
The second positive institutional change for Tuan Phong is the demise of 
SOEs. First of all, “the system of direct government subsidies to the state enterprises 
was terminated by 1992”90. Since 1992, there is already an equitization program in 
place for various industries in the economy: “Vietnam, which plans to accelerate the 
privatization of hundreds of state-run firms this year, will retain full control of 
companies that operate energy projects, the national railroads and flight-control 
operations, Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung said… The Communist-run government 
is pushing the full or partial privatization of state-run firms, including some banks and 
insurance companies, to boost the supply of shares to the country's overheated stock 
markets”91. However, there is a caveat here: “equitization has proceeded slowly due 
to resistance from managers and fear of job losses”92. Moreover, “equitization in 
Vietnam is found to target small SOEs and no larger ones, and it does not address 
the efficiency problem with state ownership since the state typically remains a 
controlling share of the equitized SOEs”93. In addition, “although the importance of 
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the state-owned sector has declined in recent years, around 35-40% of Vietnam's 
GDP is still constituted by output from SOEs. As such, a continued push for higher 
efficiency in the SOE sector is necessary for Vietnam to maintain the high growth 
levels it has enjoyed over the past decade. Nonetheless, we see a high likelihood for 
further delays in planned equity sales as the potential for criticism at the 11th 
National Congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam in January 2011 has 
compressed the likelihood of key policy decisions over the coming year”94 
Nonetheless, the long-term view is that SOEs should demise gradually. In 
such event, there will be a more „fair-play‟ field for the private sector, coupled with the 
growth of export orders, it is there for new leaders to capture the pie, albeit we should 
not be over-optimistic about the speed of the equitization process. 
 
4.2 Governance: 
Of the aforementioned four barriers to enter the global value chain (industry, 
market, chain, and institutional barriers), we‟ve covered the institutional barrier 
corresponding to the institutional element in the Integrated Strategy Model. Now, 
positive moves in the institutional framework can open doors and opportunities; but in 
order to insert oneself into the global apparel value chain, Tuan Phong also needs to 
be well informed about industry barriers. In other words, the capabilities of individual 
firms and the current make-up of the global value chain, with certain functions and 
activities being concentrated in regional clusters will determine how Tuan Phong, as 
a garment company from Vietnam, can fit in. We need to look at the value chain as a 
whole. 
 Here again, the global value chain approach proves very helpful to 
complement our theoretical model. First of all, definition: “a value chain is the range 
of activities involved in the design, production and marketing of a product, although 
there is a critical distinction between buyer-driven and producer-driven value 
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chains”95. Global value chain can be either producer-driven, or buyer-driven. “In 
producer-driven value chains, large, usually transnational, manufacturers play the 
central roles in coordinating production networks (including their backward and 
forward linkages). This is typical of capital- and technology-intensive industries such 
as automobiles, aircraft, computers, semiconductors and heavy machinery. Buyer-
driven value chains are those in which large retailers, marketers, and branded 
manufacturers play the pivotal roles in setting up decentralized production networks 
in a variety of exporting countries, typically located in developing countries. This 
pattern of trade-led industrialization has become common in labour-intensive, 
consumer-goods industries such as garments, footwear, toys, handicrafts and 
consumer electronics. Tiered networks of third-world contractors that make finished 
goods for foreign buyers carry out production. Large retailers or marketers that order 
the goods supply the specifications”96. 
The apparel industry exemplifies a buyer-driven value chain. “The relative 
ease of setting up clothing companies, coupled with the prevalence of de veloped-
country protectionism in this sector, has led to an unparalleled diversity of garment 
exporters in the third world… Entry barriers are low for most garment factories, 
although they become progressively higher when moving upstream to textiles and 
fibres”97. Below is the classification of production mode: 
Table 8-International production systems98 
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Assembly A form of industrial subcontracting, in which garment sewing 
plants are provided with imported inputs for assembly, most 
commonly in export processing zones 
Original 
equipment 
manufacturing-
OEM 
A form of commercial subcontracting. The supplying firm makes 
a product according to a design specified by the buyer; the 
product is sold under the buyer‟s brand name; the supplier and 
buyer are separate firms; and the buyer lacks control over 
distribution. 
Original brand 
name 
manufacturer-
OBM 
The upgrading by manufacturers from the production expertise 
of OEM to first the design and then the sale of their own brand 
products. 
 
The current configuration of the global value chain is like this: “Japanese 
companies and some firms in the East Asian NICs moved on from OEM export to 
original brand name manufacturing (OBM), supplementing their production expertise 
with the design and then the sale of their own branded merchandise at home and 
abroad… Retailers and marketers in developed countries tend to rely on full -package 
sourcing networks, buying ready-made apparel primarily in Asia, where 
manufacturers in Hong Kong (now named as Hong Kong Special Administrative 
Region (SAR) in China), Taiwan Province of China and the Republic of Korea 
historically specialized in this type of production. But as wages have risen, 
multilayered sourcing networks have been developed; low-wage assembly can be 
done in other parts of Asia, Africa or Latin America while the NIC manufacturers 
coordinate the full-package production process. Branded manufacturers (in 
developed countries), by contrast, tend to create production networks that focus on 
apparel assembly using imported inputs. Full-package sourcing networks are 
generally global and the production networks of branded manufacturers are 
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predominantly regional”99. The following figure illustrates whole global apparel value 
chain. 
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Figure 4-The apparel commodity chain100 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Appelbaum and Gereffi  (1994), p46 
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The trend in developed countries recently is that among retailers now have 
their own private labels, and together with branded marketers (the so called „born  
global‟ companies e.g. Nike, Reebok) they are increasingly outsourcing from low-cost 
countries. So, retailers, once customers of branded manufacturers, now are 
competing against them. Therefore, Branded manufacturers had no choice but to join 
the wagon of engaging in foreign production. They also reacted by integrating 
forward, investing in brand names and retail outlets.101 
Next, let‟s zoom into Asia, we‟ll see that companies from East Asian NIEs 
managed to successfully export to developed countries in several decades; and later 
they moved on to become the leaders of a multilayered sourcing hierarchy in Asia. 
They are the typical examples of industrial upgrading, going from assembly to OEM 
production with full-range package services. A very important aspect of OEM 
production mode is that the companies go through a valuable learning curve: “The 
OEM export role has many advantages. It helps entrepreneurs to learn foreign 
buyers‟ preferences, including international standards for price, quality and delivery. It 
also generates substantial backward linkages in the domestic economy, as OEM 
contractors are expected to develop reliable sources of supply. Moreover, OEM 
production expertise increases over time and spreads across different activities. 
Suppliers learn about the downstream and upstream segments of the apparel value 
chain from the buyer and this can become powerful competitive weapon”102 
Many of these East Asian companies have gone one step further to become 
original brand manufacturer. As mentioned the competitive dynamics earlier in 
chapter 2, part 1.2, many aspirational brand names (at the upper level) that dominate 
the domestic market are from Hong Kong. One of the reasons why it is believed by 
the company owners of Tuan Phong that the upper middle-income segment is not 
attractive for the company is the dominance of these foreign companies. Not to 
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mention capital, size, etc, their extensive experience in branding and marketing, as 
seen in the several decades of exporting, upgrading and learning, make them very 
formidable compared to Vietnamese firms. 
Over time, at a regional level, East Asian companies have focused on higher-
value-added activities and subcontract production to developing countries like 
Vietnam, either for their own sales under their own brands or to re-export the 
garments to developed countries. As such, the regional coordination in Asia and its 
sales to importers in developed countries is called triangle manufacturing: “Triangle 
manufacturing thus changes the status of NIE manufacturers from being established 
suppliers for United States‟ retailers and designers to being middlemen in buyer-
driven value chains that can include as many as 50-60 exporting countries”103. 
In other words, while there are certain retail buyers who directly source from 
Vietnam, using a representative office; most other buyers “place orders with large 
regional garment manufacturers with whom they have had a long standing 
relationships. Many of these manufacturers are headquartered in Hong Kong. The 
Hong Kong manufacturers organize production through their own FDI or joint venture 
facilities in Vietnam or pass on the order to Vietnamese suppliers. This can lower 
costs of chain governance for the brand retailer… In contrast to the large „global‟ 
traders from Hong Kong and Japan, who tend to source from SOEs, smaller regional 
traders from Taiwan and South Korea largely deal with small private and household 
based garment firms in Vietnam and supply regional markets, other developing 
countries, and lower price segments of markets in the EU and now the US… Given 
the predominance of triangular sourcing-through producers and traders-Vietnamese 
companies were often unaware of the final destinations of their goods”104 
No doubt, because of triangle manufacturing, most garment exports from 
Vietnam to developed countries have been indirect. The following figure illustrates 
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this point. Among other things, this is because “firstly, few Vietnam‟s garment 
manufacturers can provide services such as material sourcing, designing, logistic 
arrangement and full-package service for buyers, which are preconditions for buyers 
to source directly from a country. Secondly, the long distance between Vietnam and 
US or EU makes it ineffective in terms of costs (quality control and travel expenses) 
and convenience. Finally, many international buyers traditionally rely on their agents 
instead of developing sourcing capacity in house ”105 
Figure 5-Triangle manufacturing106 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As the figure shows, this is not the most desirable form of export for a 
Vietnamese company: “The value added that Vietnamese producers receive is low 
under this form. On average, Vietnamese producers do not receive more than 20% of 
recorded export value. The rest, 80% of export value, are captured by foreign buyers 
and brokers, who normally provide materials, accessories and design”107. 
My proposition for Tuan Phong is that the company should at best try to 
bypass the intermediaries by establishing direct contacts with foreign buyers. This 
isn‟t simple. First, the government would block information regarding business 
contacts. Even in situations created for direct contacts between partners like trade 
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fairs, “it was common for Vietnamese state organizations to select the participant 
suppliers”108. Second, and this is common for many Vietnamese companies, is the 
ability to source fabrics from abroad, since the Vietnamese textile industry is not 
competitive in the region. In fact, sourcing fabric abroad is impulsive due to “the 
inability of the local textile industry to meet the various demands of foreign buyers for 
specific fibre content, fabric construction, design, finish, quality, and competitive 
prices”109. In general, the Vietnamese texti le industry can only offer “low-to-mid level 
quality, but high quality fabrics still need to be imported from China, Taiwan, etc”110. 
Interviews with company owners of Tuan Phong also confirm such facts. Actually, 
Tuan Phong has already been importing fabrics from South Korea and Taiwan. The 
company owners say that recently there have been many bankruptcies of textile 
companies (mostly state-owned), and that local garments are both ugly and 
expensive; despite being charged with tariffs, imported fabrics are still generally both 
more beautiful and cheaper. 
Furthermore, there are a number of other reasons of why exporting directly 
has been difficult for most Vietnamese companies and the answers to overcoming 
these barriers lie in upgrading the necessary capacity and capabilities of the firm in 
question. Such a process of upgrading is continuous, requiring a pattern of growth, 
reinvestment, and learning. 
Put differently, the strategy proposed for Tuan Phong is to first to position 
itself into the global value chain as an original equipment manufacturer, and second 
to try its best to bypass the intermediaries in East Asia by trying to establish direct 
contacts with buyers and evolving itself through an upgrading process. Regarding the 
latter point, Tuan Phong will particularly need to enhance the scope of its activities 
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from merely undertaking cut-make-trim (CMT) to free-on board (FOB), as well as 
improving capacity, delivery, etc. In the longer term, becoming an original brand 
manufacturer is envisaged. Generally, it goes down to improving resources and 
capabilities over time. 
For now, “a large part Vietnam‟s garment manufacturers are doing CMT for 
buying agents and buying offices. The proportions of CMT and FOB are 70% and 
30% respectively”111. The CMT arrangement is the like a “putting out” arrangement in 
a modern sense: the buyers provide the fabrics, design specifications, etc. all that‟s 
needed for the producers is to cut, make (sew), and trim. Under this arrangement, the 
producers carry relatively small risk compared to buyers or traders. The reason is 
that the latter parties need to forecast invest capital in advance regarding “demand 
fluctuations that change frequently and unsystematically based on fashion trends and 
vogues. In this context, risks related to non-performing inventory becomes 
substantial, and therefore capabilities to effectively manage such risks are crucial… 
This is one of the main reasons why the value-added content of the current 
production modality is low for Vietnamese suppliers”112. According to the same 
source, a second source of risk that buyers (regional intermediaries) carry is that 
there is a potential to shirk from producers, e.g. embezzlement of input materials, late 
delivery. In fact, “governing such networks is itself a highly knowledge intensive 
function, prone to contract uncertainty with serious post-contractual moral hazard 
issues”113. The CMT mode can be considered equivalent to the assembly mode of 
production as defined in table 8. 
A more sophisticated mode of production compared to CMT is Free-on-board 
(FOB). Under this arrangement, “Vietnamese suppliers purchase the necessary input 
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materials instead of being supplied for free by their buyers”, so in the end the 
producers are paid for the whole garment, not just a processing fee. There are three 
types of FOB, with incremental levels of added value: FOB I, FOB II, FOB III. Among 
these, FOB I and FOB II are equivalent to the OEM manufacturing mode, while FOB 
III corresponds to the OBM as in table 8. 
Table 9-Types of FOB114 
FOB I Vietnamese firms purchase input materials for processing from suppliers 
that are designated by foreign buyers. The difference between this and 
CMT is thus very small. 
FOB II Vietnamese firms receive garment samples from foreign buyers. Based on 
these samples, they produce similar garments using materials that they 
must procure somewhere without any directions from buyers. 
FOB III Under this arrangement, the Vietnamese firms initiate production of 
garments based on their own design, with no prior commitment of any 
kind from foreign buyers. 
 
All these types of production modes or contractual arrangement can be 
illustrated in the following figure. 
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Figure 6-FOB classification according to the production flow and 
functional process115 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FOB III is the farthest goal to achieve and evolve into for Tuan Phong. Here 
branding and marketing plays a key role. Also here, the companies would “have 
changed their primary function from suppliers to coordinators of their own value 
chain, with some functional responsibilities of buyers”116. 
 
4.3 Resources and capabilities: 
Look back at the chapter on theory, it was mentioned that there is a 
relationship between the governance modes, e.g. CMT, FOB, original equipment 
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manufacturer, original brand manufacturer, etc. and the nature of the resources and 
capabilities that a company possess. We cannot discuss one but not mentioning the 
other. So, in this section, a discussion of what to improve at the company levels in 
order to achieve its goals is presented. 
 
4.3.1 Capacity Expansion: 
The first thing to do in the next three years is to expand capacity. Company 
owners of Tuan Phong believe that their current clients are expanding their number of 
supermarkets nationwide. Therefore more and more orders are expected to come. 
Retaining earnings and reinvesting in new plants and machines are ways to boost 
growth. The informers also believe that at least a company size of 300 machines is 
required in order to undertake foreign orders. 
 
4.3.2 Reorganization 
Next, reorganization is necessary right now. Below is the current 
organizational chart 
Figure 7-Company structure117 
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Tuan Phong is owned by two people: Mr. Le and Mrs. Pham, each owns 50% 
of the company‟s total assets. Mr. Le is officially head of the company, with the title 
general director. He is at the same time the operations manager and the designer. 
On the other hand, Mrs. Pham is the sales manager, there is a treasurer reporting 
directly to her. Being a co-owner, Mrs. Pham not only heads the sales office but also 
is responsible for recruitment and participates with Mr. Le in setting strategies. The 
accounting department is headed by the chief accountant. The inventory and 
payment accountants report to her. The former is responsible for updating 
information about the inventory, e.g. buttons, zips, press studs, buckles, threads, 
marks, chains, etc. while the latter is responsible for updating information about 
accounts payable and accounts receivable. The chief accountant is then prepare 
financial reports to owners and tax officers. 
The problem is that the general director holds to many positions 
simultaneously. Reorganization is to be implemented. I propose that a human 
resource office should be set up; one person in charge is enough. A designer should 
be hired. In addition, two people should be hired for marketing and sales. In fact, right 
now even basic things like company brochures and product catalogues are non-
existent. Interestingly, this is not an exception among Vietnamese companies: “most 
companies do not have company profiles, nor information about their products or 
services in a readily available form for international buyers. Companies seldom 
participate in international or local trade fairs, and have no idea about the 
requirements of foreign markets. They also lack knowledge in promoting their 
products business to business”118. 
 
4.3.3 Production arrangement 
After two years of domestic expansion, Tuan Phong can start exporting to 
foreign markets. I propose to enter the field under the FOB I right away if financially 
possible, instead of CMT. First, “CMT work offers limited scope for upgrading, and 
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continued reliance on it increases vulnerability”119. Second, FOB I is not too risky for 
Tuan Phong to undertake. In fact, “although this form of contractual arrangement 
takes the FOB form, the fundamental difference from CMT is very different; 
furthermore, Tuan Phong can gain more knowledge about sourcing fabrics abroad as 
well as establishing contacts with more foreign textile producers since “buyers specify 
not only the exact specifications and colour of the textile and accessories that 
Vietnamese suppliers must procure, but also from which texti le producers they must 
procure”120. 
  
4.3.4 Product diversification: 
When Tuan Phong starts to export, it is recommended to diversify into a few 
items that would sell well. This certainly depends on specific partners. However the 
following information in 2005 about the US market, coupled with table 9, gives hints 
about categories are doing well in exports: 
“It is noted that Vietnam nearly fill the quota for categories 334/335, 338/339, 
340/640, 342/642, 359-S/659-S, 434, 440, 620, and exceed quota for categories 
638/639, 647/648 and 341/641. It is noted that in 2005 the most important category 
of 338/339 (30% of total export value to US market) nearly fi lled quota (96.58%), the 
remaining 3.42% unfilled is likely the result of the quota distribution system of 
Vietnam. However, in the first half of 2005, when China was not imposed by quota, 
its export on this category increased nearly 450% while that of Vietnam fell 29%. The 
drop means that Vietnam is not competitive in this category compared with China but 
still competitive compared with other exporting countries”121. 
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Table 10-US Garment Imports from Vietnam in 2005: Quota and Fill 
Rate122 
Category Product  Unit  Quota 2005 Fill Rate Quota 2006 Increase  
200 Sewing Thrds Kg 324,210 29.43% 13.36% 
310 Comb Cot Yrn  Kg 734,876 7.66% 13.36% 
332 Cot Hosiery Dpr 1,080,700 1.97% 13.36% 
333 Suit Coats Doz 38,905 40.36% 13.36% 
334/335 Cotton Coats Doz 697,247 89.59% 13.36% 
338/339 Cot Knit Shirts Doz 14,183,582 96.58% 15.65% 
340/640 Wov Shirts M/B Doz 2,146,505 96.92% 13.36% 
341/641 Wov Blouses Doz 823,040 110.14% 13.36% 
342/642 Skirts Doz 583,796 83.25% 13.36% 
345 Cot Sweaters Doz 307,851 24.77% 13.36% 
347/348 Cot Trousers Doz 7,199,151 84.69% 15.65% 
351/651 Nightwear Doz 516,012 74.78% 13.36% 
352/652 Underwear Doz 1,965,906 64.76% 13.36% 
359-C/659-C Coveralls Kg 351,041 17.82% 13.36% 
359-S/659-S Swimwear Kg 567,368 85.67% 13.36% 
434 Wool Coat M/B Doz 15,863 79.97% 8.37% 
435 Wool Coat W/G Doz 39,138 61.33% 8.38% 
440 
Wov Wool 
Shirts Doz 2,448 98.41% 
8.37% 
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447 Wool Trsrs M/B Doz 50,919 54.83% 8.37% 
448 Wool Trsr W/G Doz 31,335 34.68% 8.37% 
620 MMF Wov Fab M2 6,877,575 77.08% 13.36% 
632 MMF Hosiery Dpr 540,350 4.90% 13.36% 
638/639 MMF Knit Shirt Doz 1,289,975 104.11% 13.36% 
645/646 MMF Sweaters Doz 208,578 48.17% 13.36% 
647/648 MMF Trousers Doz 2,097,655 101.18% 13.36% 
Source: United States International Trade Commission 
Regarding the EU market, the picture in 2003 and 2004, as shown together 
with table 10, can also suggest a range of certain product categories to diversify into, 
so as to sell to foreign buyers: 
“Vietnam has competitive advantages of Categories 7, 8, 14, 15, 16, 17 and 21 in EU 
market by having quite good growth rates and market shares. 
Shirts for man and female including categories 7 and 8: Although quota fill rate of 
Vietnam for these cats in the year 2004 is not very high due to EU raised quota for 
Vietnam by the end of the year and enterprises could not make full use of the added 
quota, export growth rate for the categories is quite high. Especially for category 7, 
export turnover increased more than 88% in the year 2004 in comparison with the 
year 2003. Growth rate of categories. 8 reached 5.04%. Exports for the same 
categories of other countries seems to be high in quantity but the growth rates tend 
to decrease. Except for export of category. 8 of India, other suppliers could not filled 
all quota. Besides, Eurotex has requested consideration of China textile safeguards 
on twelve categories of textile and garment and category 7 is one of those. 
Outerwears belong to categories 14, 15, 17, 21: For this categories, EU imports 
increased remarkably, ranging from 6 to 14% for each category. Export growth rates 
of Vietnam for these cats are also high: 42% for category. 17, 80% for category 15, 
181% for category 14. Particularly for anoraks and category 21, EU imports mainly 
from Vietnam with the share of 86 % in 2003 and 87% in 2004. Vietnam almost faces 
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no considerable competition for this cat. Quota fill rates of other suppliers for these 
cats are not so high.  
For men or boys‟ suits and ensembles of category 16: Export from Vietnam to EU 
increased sharply at the rate of 15% while export of the same category from China 
was still largest in quantity but trends to fa ll (-8% in the year 2004 in comparison with 
the year 2003).”123 
Table 11: Competitive garment products of Vietnam in EU market124 
Exporters 
2003 2004 
 % Exp 
2004/2003 
Export  
(US$ million) % quota fill 
Export  
(US$ million) % quota fill 
Cat. 7 
India 88.87 106.78 80.98 97.84 91.12 
Market share (%) 42.67  37.98   
Hong Kong 30.33 75.49 27.51 63.33 90.69 
Market share (%) 14.56  12.90   
China 12.89 103.00 17.93 98.03 139.15 
Market share (%) 6.19  8.41   
Pakistan 10.29 58.40 16.33 72.12 158.69 
Market share (%) 4.94  7.66   
Indonesia 12.38 76.18 12.15 66.18 98.11 
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Market share (%) 14.56  5.70   
Thailand 4.98 56.09 6.31 47.88 126.63 
Market share (%) 2.39  2.96   
Vietnam 2.76 81.93 5,186,586 58.04 188.18 
Market share (%) 1.32  2.43   
Total import 208.30  213.20  102.35 
Cat. 8 
Bangladesh 130.09 Surveillance 132.69 Surveillance 102.00 
Market share (%) 43.50  43.99   
China 18.32 101.19 27.38 95.87 149.42 
Market share (%) 6.13  9.08   
India 58.91 106.11 56.07 100.26 95.19 
Market share (%) 19.70  18.59   
Hong Kong 27.90 53.60 21.60 36.30 77.44 
Market share (%) 9.33  7.16   
Indonesia 18.91 73.96 17.73 63.42 93.74 
Market share (%) 6.33  5.88   
Vietnam 14.29 99.04 15.01 55.92 105.04 
Market share (%) 4.78  4.98   
Total import 299.04  301.63  100.87 
Cat. 14 
China 10.25 71.30 11.35 59.31 110.73 
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Market share (%) 96.85  94.13   
Vietnam 0.23 46.03 0.64 87.81 281.13 
Market share (%) 2.14  5.28   
S. Korea 0.67 0.78 0.67 0.75 100.07 
Market share (%) 0.63  0.56   
Taiwan 0.40 0.83 0.41 0.08 10.33 
Market share (%) 0.38  0.03   
Total import 10.58  12.06  113.93 
Cat. 15 
China 18.93 101.78 20.91 97.96 110.44 
Market share (%) 60.69  59.48   
Ucraina 5.37 Surveillance 7.01 Surveillance 130.42 
Market share (%) 17.22  19.93   
India 1.72 20.17 2.08 19.84 120.96 
Market share (%) 5.52  5.92   
Croatia 1.16 Surveillance 1.33 Surveillance 115.32 
Market share (%) 3.71  3.80   
Vietnam 0.73 103.29 1.32 94.05 180.19 
Market share (%) 2.36  3.77   
Total import 31.19  35.16  112.70 
Cat.16 
China 18.67 102.99 17.17 93.35 91.98 
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Market share (%) 89.97  91.51   
Croatia 0.68 Surveillance 0.70 Surveillance 101.90 
Market share (%) 3.29  3.71   
Vietnam 0.50 Surveillance 0.57 Surveillance 115.57 
Market share (%) 2.39  3.05   
Bosnia-Herzagovina 0.18 Surveillance 0.22 Surveillance 126.87 
Market share (%) 0.85  1.20   
Total import 20.75  18.76  90.42 
Cat. 17 
China 6.10 50.29 6.43 46.04 105.50 
Market share (%) 97.53  96.89   
Vietnam 0.15 Surveillance 0.19 Surveillance 142.28 
Market share (%) 2.15  2.88   
Total import 6.25  6.64  106.20 
Cat. 21 
Vietnam 12.37 60.73 13.81 56.51 111.71 
Market share (%) 86.04  87.71   
Cambodia 0.63 Surveillance 899,078 Surveillance 141.83 
Market share (%) 4.41  5.71   
Laos 0.61 Surveillance 408,977 Surveillance 67.51 
Market share (%) 4.22  2.60   
Total import 14.37  15.75  109.58 
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Source: http://sigl.cec.eu.int 
 
Interviews with company owners indicate that they do plan to diversify into 
male and female shirts right next year. This is the right move. 
 
4.3.5 Quality standards: 
This is particularly important in the case of EU buyers. The following is self-
explaining: “To be certain that garment suppliers are capable to provide garment at a 
certain quality, EU buyers normally require garment suppliers to achieve certain 
types of quality certificate.  The most widely used quality management system is ISO 
9001:2000. The standards of ISO 9001:2000 provide a framework for standardising 
procedures and working methods, not only with regard to quality control but to the 
entire organisation: from purchasing to processing, quality control, sales and 
administration.  ISO 900:2000 requires that you describe exactly your processes (or 
activities), and develop procedures according to which the processes or activities 
should be performed, and then follow these procedures in daily business activities.  
This process guarantees that you always do things the same way and produce stable 
quality products.  There are numerous benefits associated with a certified ISO 
900:2000 management system: improved product, process and service quality; 
increased customer satisfaction levels; improved productivity, less waste; and an 
expectation from buyers”125.  
 
4.3.6 Enhanced services: 
Among other things, fabric sourcing is actually the most critical, and is the 
first capability Tuan Phong should develop, before enhancing other services like 
packaging, shipping, etc. Frequent trips to Hong Kong, China, Taiwan, and South 
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Korea are recommended in order to study and bui ld contacts with textile producers, 
since textiles from Vietnam are of inferior quality. 
In order to obtain this, two things need to be acquired: knowledge and 
finance, since the following are among the reasons why upgrading has been difficult 
for most Vietnamese companies: “Weak material sourcing skills, including 
understanding all kinds of fabrics and yarns, including their characteristics and uses, 
mill location and negotiation; and sourcing materials require manufacturers to have 
enough financial resources and be able to face risks related to un-usage of 
purchased materials resulting from possible broken-down contracts”126. 
Further into the future, to become an original brand manufacturer is to be 
able to offer full-package services to foreign buyers, which means being able to 
perform a number of service: “material sourcing, designing, logistic arrangement and 
full-package service for buyers, which are preconditions for buyers to source directly 
from a country”127. In order words, the company should finally be able “to undertake 
coordination roles of the production and distribution networks and govern them 
efficiently”128. This, in turn, implies the ability to “identify most suitable suppliers for 
certain products in terms of price, quality, timely delivery, and quota availability; 
control production quality; identify and contract with material providers; and shipping 
arrangement for materials into manufacturer‟s country and for finished garment out of 
the country”129. 
 
4.4 Strategy: 
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This part discusses more on where and when to enter the export market. 
Let‟s consider market choice, where to enter. First of all, of the three markets, 
Japan is the less desirable one, because “here Vietnam‟s export growth has been 
relatively modest for a long period even before 2004”130. Furthermore, it is worth 
noting the difference between EU and US buyers: “EU buyers are more concerned 
about quality than US buyers. They pay higher price and normally at lower quantity 
per order than US buyers. Also differently from US buyers, who provide materials to 
manufacturers, more than half of EU buyers require manufacturers to source 
materials and send material samples to them for approval. Finally, unlike US buyers, 
EU buyers tend to stick to familiar garment providers”131. 
There is actually a trade-off between choosing the US or the EU. Although 
the US market is less demanding than EU, it requires large-scale production. On the 
other hand, upgrading capabilities, not merely capacity, merit penetration into the EU. 
“In comparison to US buyers, EU buyers normally order garment of more complicated 
design and smaller volume. Some Vietnam‟s garment manufacturers, which get used 
to orders from US buyers with simple design and large volume, find difficult to meet 
these requirements of EU buyers. Reasons given to explain this include fragmented 
markets of different countries with different characteristics and end-users more 
fashion-sensitive (most of the world‟s fashion centres are in EU, including Paris, 
Milan, and London; while New York is the fashion centre in US). This means garment 
SMEs with its smaller production capacity would have a certain advantage over large 
garment enterprises in exporting to EU”132. 
My proposition is that the US market should be prioritized over the EU, since 
producing for the EU imply one important thing: sourcing fabric on one‟s own. One 
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should only do that later, when the experience in fabric sourcing and the finance 
necessary to carry on such working capital is well in place. In fact, “different from 
export to US market, export to EU to a large extent requires Vietnam‟s garment 
manufacturers to source materials. Therefore, garment enterprises want to export to 
EU market should build relations with material suppliers in advance”133. That said, 
flexibility should be maintained at a certain level. An interesting point is that by 
“selling to customers in different markets using various forms of export mode at the 
same time” and not being “locked in with only one buyer at a single market”, is key to 
flexibility and to be able to shift customers when conditions require 134. 
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
This paper discusses export strategy for Tuan Phong Ltd, using the 
Integrated Trategy Model. 
First, a snapshot on the world trade regime, the Vietnamese garment 
industry, and the company along with its current position in the domestic competitive 
dynamics was given as background information. 
Second, an theoretical framework was elaborated, with its emphasis on 
market entry strategy, a business-level strategy applied to this particular case, as 
opposed to the case of MNE entering a new national market. Besides, only the most 
relevant elements of the framework were used to discuss the future strategy of Tuan 
Phong. 
Third, an extensive discussion based on those elements aforementioned was 
presented. I started with institutions. The point here is that opportunities for export 
arose for the private sector due to both positive movements in the world trade regime 
and the liberalization of the domestic economy. Then, the governance element was 
mentioned. Here it is necessary to grasp the whole picture of the global apparel 
industry, as well as the nuanced regional relationship with brokers in East Asia, in 
order to understand where Tuan Phong could be if it ever enters the export market. 
This point links directly to contractual arrangement like CMT or FOB. Next, resources 
and capabilities were mentioned. In order to move on with export, capacity 
expansion, reorganization, product diversification, quality standards, and enhanced 
services are to be achieved over time. Finally, the strategy to enter export markets is 
that the US is recommended over the EU due to less stringent requirements on style, 
quality, etc. albeit their orders are larger and are best suited for larger -size 
companies. 
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